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Resumen
La incorporación de la heterogeneidad del estudiante en el análisis, las diferencias 
en la calidad de la educación y en la probabilidad de repitencia, típicas en los 
países en desarrollo, marca la diferencia entre una inversión en educación atrac-
tiva y otra inconveniente. La metodología asocia la calidad educacional y las tasas 
de repitencia con los retornos a la educación. En particular, parece evidente que 
menos educación secundaria, en el caso de Uruguay, es una inversión inconveni-
ente para los estudiantes con desventajas, aun no teniendo en cuenta la posibilidad 
de que dichos alumnos no puedan afrontar los costos de oportunidad, hecho que 
probablemente también explica la fuerte deserción de este tipo de estudiantes en 
muchos países en desarrollo. 
Clasificación JEL: I21, J24
Palabras Clave: deserción escolar, calidad escolar, tasas de repitencia 
Abstract
This paper shows that when student heterogeneity is introduced in the analysis, 
differences in the quality of education and in the probability of repetition, typical 
in developing countries, mark the contrast between an attractive and an inconve-
nient investment in education. The methodology associates educational quality 
and repetition rates with educational returns. In particular, it makes apparent that 
lower secondary education, in the case of Uruguay, is an inconvenient investment 
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for disadvantaged students, even disregarding the possibility of such students not 
being able to afford the opportunity costs, this fact probably also explains the 
heavy dropout rates of this student type in many developing countries. 
JEL classification: I21, J24
Keywords: school dropouts, school quality, repetition rates
INTRODUCTION
Standard approaches to the estimations of education returns (reviewed, for 
instance, in Glewwe, 1996; Psacharopoulos, 1995; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 
2004) rely heavily on the labour market return on the number of schooling years 
completed. However, it has widely been accepted that human capital cannot be 
measured adequately by the years of schooling, as the quality of education re-
ceived directly affects the individual’s endowment of human capital and, conse-
quently, the individual’s future benefits. Moreover, overlooking the occurrence of 
grade repetition leads to errors in estimates of the opportunity costs of schooling. 
Several improvements to the standard approach have been suggested, and although 
some authors consider the quality of education (e.g., Hanushek et al., 2006), the 
consideration of grade repetition is rarer in the education returns literature, and the 
inequality implications of these issues are usually overlooked. 
The prevalence of repetition has, in general, received scarce attention, and 
the focus has been mainly on the negative effects on expectations (Jacob and Lef-
bren, 2004, 2007; Sautu, 1999; Rose et al., 1983, among others); thus, the eco-
nomic implications of repetition have not been at the centre of the discussion. This 
note pursues a similar aim as that of Behrman and Deolalikar (1991) but allows for 
student heterogeneity; this note also follows a similar approach to that in a com-
panion paper (Patron, 2008), although the emphasis here is on the methodology 
foundations to compute a priori returns across heterogeneous students, providing 
a decision tool for students. Moreover, contrary to the mainstream of the returns to 
schooling literature, here the economic returns are probabilistic (non-observable). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the in-
equality aspects in education. Section 3 describes the methodological approach 
and estimates the expected internal rate of return for the Uruguayan case. Section 
4 concludes. An Appendix provides additional computation details.
Estudios Económicos. N° 61, Julio-Diciembre 2013. 27-42 29
WHEN MORE SCHOOLING IS NOT WORTH THE EFFORT: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DROPOUT...
I. WHY IS THERE INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION?
Several data sources show the unequal distribution of educational attain-
ment across income groups. For instance, Table 1 presents school coverage by 
income quintiles in several countries, showing that, although the completion of 
primary level is similar across income quintiles (almost universal), the completion 
rates at higher levels are not. The table shows that school coverage across income 
groups is significantly unequally distributed. In fact, the rates of attendance are 
lower the lower the income group is, and higher the higher income group is. Why 
could this be happening? Is one of the groups behaving rationally and the other 
not? Understanding such divergent schooling decisions is crucial to tackle ad-
equately the unequal achievements in education.
Table 1 - School Enrolment Rates between Richest 
and Poorest Quintiles (%), by Age. Selected countries.
Source: Extract from PREAL (2006), p. 37.
Moreover, differences in attendance rates are not the only problem affect-
ing lower secondary school that raises equity concerns. The observed student per-
formance, measured by repetition rates or by standardized tests, is also segmented 
by income groups. For instance, Table 2 presents the results of PISA tests for 
selected countries. The table shows that scores decrease with income bracket, in 
both developing and developed countries. For instance, in Brazil, the mean score 
of the 90th percentile is about 80% higher than the corresponding score for the 
10th percentile; for the OECD countries, the gap is not that high but is still impres-
sive, as the mean for the 90th percentile is about 65% higher than that of the 10th.
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Table 2 - PISA results by income brackets for selected countries
    Percentiles
Country Mean score 10th 50th 90th
Australia 515 384 521 638
Chile 449 342 451 556
Finland 536 419 542 642
Korea 539 435 545 635
Mexico 425 314 429 531
United Kingdom 494 370 497 616
United States 500 372 501 625
OECD average 493 369 499 610
Argentina 398 257 403 535
Brazil 412 293 409 537
Source: Extract from OECD (2010), p. 152.
In summary, the above description shows that educational attainment across 
income groups is unequally distributed. The impact of these facts on staying-at-
schooling decisions are discussed in the rest of the paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
As Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) demonstrate, expected economic return 
affects the number of high school graduates. For the individual, the economic 
gains of further education are given by the difference in lifetime income between 
the benefits of additional schooling and its costs; however, across heterogeneous 
agents the fruits from education are unevenly reaped.
In the labour market, earnings depend on the qualifications acquired during 
the schooling years, as human capital determines the productivity of individu-
als. The acquired knowledge of students defines ‘school quality’ (following Ha-
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nushek, 1979), modelled as 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate knowledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immediately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computation purposes (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of 
 where 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate knowledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immediately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computation purposes (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of 
 is the resource intensity 
per student, and the sub-indexes j  and k  represent schooling level and student 
type, respectively. Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low quality,
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repeti ion rat s are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate knowledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immediately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present valu  of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be c nsidered for computation purposes (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the differenc
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of 
, where 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (foll wing Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the r source inte sity per student, and the sub-indexes j
and k  rep sent schooling level and student type, resp ctively. 
Repetition rates are mod lled as a cons quence of low
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accum late knowledge, whereas repeat rs do n t. The accum lation f
jkq  during the schooling years i  



m
j
jkmk qf
1  whi  measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whet r to c nti ue studying or to g  t  
the labour market is based on the comparison between the r sp ctive 
lifetimes incom s of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immediat ly with the qualification 
acquired up to level j is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w is the wage rate p r efficiency unit (assumed constan ), 
 tt d1  is the discount factor, and d is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings iven by kjEI 1 , the present value of expe t d 
lifetime income for tha  schooling level. All a ternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of ccurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computatio  pur oses (see b low).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the differenc  
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate tha  makes the b nefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expect d internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute i  for heterogeneous students is present d below in four simple 
steps, whic  onstitute the main contribution f this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of
. Successful students accumulate knowl-
dge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumul tion of 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulat  knowledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immediately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horiz n, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allo  earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computation purposes (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of 
 during the schooling 
years is 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modell d as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate knowledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immed ately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computation purposes (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefit 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic appro ch to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribut on of this ote.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (pri ary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of 
 which measures the stock of knowledge up to lev l m . 
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to the labour 
market is based o  the compa ison between the respective lifetimes incomes of the 
two alternatives. The present value of income for those who decide to work im-
e iately with the qualification acquired p to level j  is given by 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg i  the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexe  j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate knowle ge, whereas repeaters do ot. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which easures the 
tock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison b twee  the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who ecide to work immediately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given b  


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computation purpos s (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected internal rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping pat s for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of
where T  is the time h rizon, w  is the wag  rate p r fficiency unit (assumed 
constant), ( )tt d+= 11β  is the discount factor, and d  s the disc unt rat . Fur-
th r studi s allow earnings given by 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of l w 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , w re 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate kn wle ge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  during the scho ling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  whi h measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual d cisions on whether t  continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is ba ed on the compariso  b tween th  respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value f income 
for those who decide to work immedi tely with the q alification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T is the 
time horizon, w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow arnings given  kjEI 1 , t e present value of expected 
life im  income for that scho ling lev l. All alternativ  pat s through 
schooling y ars, considering the r sk of occurrence of r petition, n ed to 
be considered for computation purposes (see below).  
The benefits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that mak s th  b n fi s 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expect d internal rate f return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
compute it for heterogeneous students is presented bel w in four simple 
steps, which constitute the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
ti ry) is not st aightforward, consideri  the frequent occurrence of 
, pr sent value of expected lifetime 
income for that schooling level. All alternative paths thr ugh scho lin  years, con-
sidering the risk of occurrence of repetiti n, need to be considered f r computatio  
purposes (see below).
The b nefits from further sc ooling c me fr m the difference 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate knowledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  d ri g the chooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which measures the 
stock of knowledge up to level m .  
Individual decisions on whether to continue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the respective 
lifetimes incomes of the two alternatives. The present value of income 
for those who decide to work immediately with the qualification 
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon,  is the wag  rate per efficiency u it (assumed constant), 
 tt d 11  is t e di count factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow earnings given by kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetim income f r tha  schooling level. All alternative paths through 
schooling years, considering the risk of occurrence of repetition, need to 
be considered for computation purposes (see below).  
The be efits from further schooling come from the difference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . The rate that makes the benefits 01  jkkj IWEI  is the 
expected intern l rate of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to 
c mpute it for heterogeneous students is presented below in four simple 
steps, which constitu e the main contribution of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lower secondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering th  frequent occurrence of 
.
The rate that makes the benefits 
productivity of individuals. The acquired knowledge of students defines 
‘school quality’ (following Hanushek, 1979), modelled as  jkjkjk gqq   
where jkg  is the resource intensity per student, and the sub-indexes j  
and k  represent schooling level and student type, respectively. 
Repetition rates are modelled as a consequence of low 
quality,  jkjkjk q  , where 0 jkjk q . Successful students 
accumulate kn wledge, whereas repeaters do not. The accumulation of 
jkq  duri g the schooling years is 



m
j
jkmk qf
1  which mea ur s t e 
stock of knowl dge up to level m .  
I dividual decisions on whet r to conti ue studying or to go to 
the labour market is based on the comparison between the resp ctive 
lifetimes inc mes of the two alternatives. The pr sent value of income 
for those who decide to work immediately with the qual f c tio  
acquired up to level j  is given by 


T
t
t
jkjk wfIW
1
 , where T  is the 
time horizon, w is the wage rate per efficiency unit (assumed consta t), 
 tt d 11  is the discount factor, and d  is the discount rate. Further 
studies allow arnings given b kjEI 1 , the present value of expected 
lifetime income for that schooling level. Al  alternative paths through 
schooling years, cons dering the risk of occurrence of rep tition, n ed to 
be considered fo  computation purp ses (see b low).  
The benefits from furth r schooling come from the fference 
jkkj IWEI 1 . T e r t  t t makes t  efits 01  jkkj IWEI  s the 
expected int rnal rate f return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approac  to 
compute it f r heter ge eo s stu en s is presented below in f ur s mple 
steps, which stitut  the main contr b tion of this note.  
II.1 Mapping paths for students in lowe  se ondary 
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary) is not straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of 
 is the ect d internal rate 
of return (IRR) of schooling. A basic approach to compute it for heterog neous
students is pr sent d below in four simpl  teps, which constitute the main contri-
bution of t s note. 
II.1 Mapping pa s for tudents in lower secondary
Student transit across the system (primary, secondary, and tertiary) is not 
straightforward, considering the frequent occurrence of repetition in developing 
countries. Table 3 shows the involved risks in this path that must be considered, 
for instance, the options after primary, assuming that individuals will exit after two 
consecutive repetitions. 
The first column of the table lists all possible paths, pass ( p ) or no pass 
( n ) on each grade in lower secondary; the second column lists the qualifications ac-
quired during the corresponding path; and the third column reflects the actual work-
ing life span for each option, considering the calendar years effectively needed to 
acquire the qualification (with 65 years old as the retirement age, the working life 
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span for those not enrolling in lower secondary is 65-11=54). 
Table 3 - Mapping paths in lower secondary
repetition in developing countries. Table 3 shows the involved risks in 
this path that must be considered, for instance, the options after 
primary, assuming that individuals will exit after two consecutive 
repetitions.  
The first column of the table lists all possible paths, pass ( p ) or 
no pass ( n ) on each grade in lower secondary; the second column lists 
the qualifications acquired during the corresponding path; and the third 
column reflects the actual working life span for each option, 
considering the calendar years effectively needed to acquire the 
qualification (with 65 years old as the retirement age, the working life 
span for those not enrolling in lower secondary is 65-11=54).  
Table 3 - Mapping paths in lower secondary 
Path Qualification Working life 
1n 1n  Pf (54-2) 
1n 1p 2n 2n  1LSf (54-4) 
1n 1p 2n 2p 3n 3n  2LSf (54-6) 
1n 1p 2n 2p 3n 3p  3LSf (54-6) 
1n 1p 2n 2p 3p  3LSf (54-5) 
1n 1p 2p 3n 3n  2LSf (54-5) 
1n 1p 2p 3n 3p  3LSf (54-5) 
1n 1p 2p 3p  3LSf (54-4) 
1p 2n 2n  1LSf (54-3) 
1p 2n 2p 3n 3n  2LSf (54-5) 
1p 2n 2p 3n 3p  3LSf (54-5) 
1p 2n 2p 3p  3LSf (54-4) 
1p 2p 3n 3n  2LSf (54-4) 
1p 2p 3n 3p  3LSf (54-4) 
1p 2p 3p  3LSf (54-3) 
Source: Own elaboration. Notation: p, pass; n, no pass; grades i = 1, 2, 3, LSf  qualification acquired 
up to grade i of Lower Secondary (LS); Pf , qualification prior to entry level.
II.2 Estimation of non-observable variables
For the average student/worker, the non-observable variables jq  and jf  
for the average qualified student can be proxied by information on the workers’ 
remuneration by schooling ( jr ). For this estimate the following expression is use-
ful, on the assumption that workers receive as remuneration the value of their 
productivity gained through schooling (measured in efficiency units):
111 +++ =−=− jjjjj qwfwfrr  ,
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where jq  is the students’ acquired knowledge at level j , jf  is knowl-
edge accumulation (summing jq ), w  is the wage rate per efficiency unit (as-
sumed constant), and jr  is remuneration received by workers. 
Using data from remunerations for the Uruguayan case, the non-observ-
able variables are computed, normalizing the remuneration ( r ) for workers 
without qualification to one (and setting 1=w  for ease of computation). Ta-
ble 4 shows the resulting values for the average/student worker. The relevant 
schooling levels considered are primary, lower secondary, upper secondary 
and tertiary (
Source: Own elaboration. Notation: p, pass; n, no pass; grades i = 1, 2, 3, LSf  qualification 
acquired up to grade i of Lower Secondary (LS); Pf , qualification prior to entry level. 
 
II.2 Estimation of non-observable variables 
For the average student/worker, the non-observable variables jq  
and jf  for the average qualified student can be proxied by information 
on the workers’ remuneration by schooling ( jr ). For this estimate the 
following expression is useful, on the assumption that workers receive 
as remuneration the value of their productivity gained through 
schooling (measured in efficiency units): 
111   jjjjj qwfwfrr  , 
where jq  is the students’ acquired knowledge at level j , jf  is 
knowledge accumulation (summing jq ), w  is the wage rate per 
efficiency unit (assumed constant), and jr  is remuneration received by 
workers.  
Using data from remunerations for the Uruguayan case, the non-
observable variables are c mputed, normalizing the remuneration ( r ) 
for workers without qualification to one (and setting 1w  for ease of 
computation). Table 4 shows the resulting values for the 
average/student worker. The relevant schooling levels considered are 
primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary 
( TEUSLSPj ,,, ). 
Table 4 - Computation of non-observable variables  
–Average student-worker 
Level Remuneration jf jq  
Without primary or incomplete 3901 1.00   
Primary 5075 1.30 0.30 Pq
).
Table 4 - Computation of non-observable variables. 
Average student-worker
Level R muneration jf jq
Without primary or incomplete 3901 1.00
Primary 5075 1.30 0.30 Pq
Lower secondary 5723 1.47 0.17 qLS
Upper secondary 8047 2.06 0.60 qUP
University 15372 3.94 1.88 qTE
Source: Own estimates. Remunerations are monthly wages in Uruguayan pesos, data for 2005, from 
the National Census Bureau (INE, 2005)
A breakdown of accumulation by the average student at lower secondary 
year by year in this level, assuming equal distribution each year, gives the corre-
sponding values shown in Table 5.
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Table 5 - Computation of non-observable variables for lower secondary.
 Average student-worker
Average  
  1.30
0.06 1.36
0.06 1.41
0.06 1.47
  0.17  
Source: Own estimates
II.3 Heterogeneity in quality
The available data only allow finding proxies for the non-observable vari-
ables jq  and jf  for the average student/worker. The consideration of heteroge-
neous agents will require the introduction of a plausible assumptions of dispersion 
around the average. Alternative scenarios of dispersion for jq  and probability of 
passing grades ( ip ) by student type (advantaged and disadvantaged) are: high 
dispersion (
Lower secondary 5723 1.47 0.17 
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University 15372 3.94 1.88 TEq
Source: Own estimates. Remunerations are monthly wages in Uruguayan pesos, data for 2005, 
from the National Census Bureau (INE, 2005) 
A breakdown of accumulation by the average student at lower 
secondary year by year in this level, assuming equal distribution each 
year, gives the corresponding values shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 -  Computation of non-observable variables for lower secondary 
– Average student-worker 
 Average    
   Pf 1.30 
1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.36 
2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.41 
3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.47 
 LSq  0.17    
Source: Own estimates 
II.3 Heterogeneity in quality 
The available data only allow finding proxies for the non-
observable variables jq  and jf  for the average student/worker. The 
consideration of heterogeneous agents will require the introduction of a 
plausible assumptions of dispersion around the average. Alternative 
sc n rios of dispersion for jq  and probability f passi g grades ( ip ) by 
student type (a vantaged nd disadvantaged) are: high dispersion 
( %80 ), medium dispersion ( %40 ), and low dispersion, ( %10 ) 
(full details in the Appendix). 
II.4 Expected Internal Rate of Return 
), ediu  dispersion (
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II.3 Heterogeneity in quality 
The available data only allow finding proxies for the non-
observable variables jq  a  jf  for the average student/worker. The 
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(full details in the A pendix). 
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II.4 Expected Internal Rate of Return
The rate that makes The rate that makes 01  jkkj IWEI  is the expected IRR, 
where jkIW  is the present value of income for those who decide to 
work immediately, and kjEI 1  is the present value of expected lifetime 
income for that schooling level. After primary, the decisions of students 
will consider all alternative paths through schooling years (see Table 3), 
resulting in the following expressions: 
LSEI = 1n * 1n * Pf * 3F + 1n * 1p * 2n * 2n * 1LSf * 5F + 
1n * 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3n * 2LSf * 7F + 1n * 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3p * 
3LSf * 7F + 1n * 1p * 2n * 2p * 3p * 3LSf * 6F + 1n * 1p * 2p * 3n * 3n * 
2LSf * 6F  + 1n * 1p * 2p * 3n * 3p * 3LSf * 6F + 1n * 1p * 2p * 3p * 
3LSf * 5F + 1p * 2n * 2n * 1LSf * 4F + 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3n * 2LSf  
* 6F + 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3p * 3LSf * 6F + 1p * 2n * 2p * 3p * 
3LSf * 5F + 1p * 2p * 3n * 3n * 2LSf  * 5F + 1p * 2p * 3n * 3p * 
3LSf * 5F + 1p * 2p * 3p * 3LSf * 4F  
PIW = Pf * 0F  
where zF =  


zT
id1 1
1 , 
Considering 0 PLS IWEI  for each group, the results for expected 
IRR are obtained.  
The expected IRR of lower secondary studies for different 
groups of students is computed for the case of Uruguay, as an example 
that reveals the potential of the methodology. The values for repetition 
rates 1n = 0.27, 2n = 0.23, and 3n = 0.24 are obtained from ANEP 
(2005); estimations for LSif  are shown in the Appendix. Table 6 
presents the expected IRR for lower secondary school in a time horizon 
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The rate that makes 01  jkkj IWEI  is the expected IRR, 
where jkIW  is the present value of income for those who decide to 
work immediately, and kjEI 1  is the present value of expected lifetime 
income for that schooling level. After primary, the decisions of students 
will consider all alternative paths through schooling years (see Table 3), 
resulting in the following expressions: 
LSEI = 1n * 1n * Pf * 3F + 1n * 1p * 2n * 2n * 1LSf * 5F + 
1n * 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3n * 2LSf * 7F + 1n * 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3p * 
3LSf * 7F + 1n * 1p * 2n * 2p * 3p * 3LSf * 6F + 1n * 1p * 2p * 3n * 3n * 
2LSf * 6F  + 1n * 1p * 2p * 3n * 3p * 3LSf * 6F + 1n * 1p * 2p * 3p * 
3LSf * 5F + 1p * 2n * 2n * 1LSf * 4F + 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3n * 2LSf  
* 6F + 1p * 2n * 2p * 3n * 3p * 3LSf * 6F + 1p * 2n * 2p * 3p * 
3LSf * 5F + 1p * 2p * 3n * 3n * 2LSf  * 5F + 1p * 2p * 3n * 3p * 
3LSf * 5F + 1p * 2p * 3p * 3LSf * 4F  
PIW = Pf * 0F  
where zF =  


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Considering 0 PLS IWEI  for each group, the results for expected 
IRR are obtained.  
The expected IRR of lower secondary studies for different 
groups of students is computed for the case of Uruguay, as an example 
that reveals the potential of the methodology. The values for repetition 
rates 1n = 0.27, 2n = 0.23, and 3n = 0.24 are obtained from ANEP 
(2005); estimations for LSif  are shown in the Appendix. Table 6 
presents the expected IRR for lower secondary school in a time horizon 
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Considering 0 PLS IWEI  for each group, the results for expected 
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rates 1n = 0.27, 2n = 0.23, and 3n = 0.24 are obtained from ANEP 
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 ach group, the results for exp cted 
IRR are obtained.
 The expected IRR of l wer secondary studies for different groups of stu-
dents is computed for the case of Uruguay, as an example t at reveals the potential 
of the methodology. The values for repetitio  rates 1n = 0.27, 2n = 0.23, and 3n = 
0.24 are obtained from ANEP (2005); estimations for LSif  are shown in the Appen-
dix. Table 6 pres nts the expected IRR for lower secondary school in a time horizon 
covering th  whole working life span for advantaged and disadvantaged students. 
Table 6 - Expected IRR for heterogeneous students
Source: Own estimates with methodology in section 3.
covering the whole working life span for advantaged and disadvantaged 
studen s.  
 
Tabl  6 - Expected IRR for heterogeneous students 
 
Source: Own estimates with methodology in section 3. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the expected IRR is low for the 
average student, computed with and without repetition. When we 
consider heterogeneous students, marked differences across student 
groups emerge. Whereas for advantaged students, the expected IRR is 
at reasonable levels (2.4%-5.8%) in all cases, for disadvantaged 
students, pursuing lower secondary studies could have a negative return 
when we take into account the occurrence of repetition. Even in cases 
where the return for the disadvantaged is positive, it is very low (1.4%-
2.9%). Thus, the expected IRR values computed for the Uruguayan case 
allow the conclusion that lower secondary education is an inconvenient 
investment for disadvantaged students, as they would very likely obtain 
a negative return; hence, they behave rationally, dropping out of school 
early. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In most countries, schooling decisions seem to have a clear 
association with level of income. This is even more troublesome in 
developing countries, where high exit rates at compulsory stages are 
common. Why could this be happening? When students heterogeneity is 
considered, it can be seen that the benefits and cost of education differ 
across income groups. Indeed, differences in the quality of education 
and in the probability of repetition make the difference between an 
attractive and an inconvenient investment in secondary education 
between advantaged and disadvantaged students. Thus, according to 
this approach, both groups taking opposite schooling decisions behave 
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As can be seen in Table 6, the expected IRR is low for the average stu-
dent, computed with and without repetition. When we consider heterogeneous stu-
dents, marked differences across student groups emerge. Whereas for advantaged 
students, the expected IRR is at reasonable levels (2.4%-5.8%) in all cases, for 
disadvantaged students, pursuing lower secondary studies could have a negative 
return when we take into account the occurrence of repetition. Even in cases where 
the return for the disadvantaged is positive, it is very low (1.4%-2.9%). Thus, 
the expected IRR values computed for the Uruguayan case allow the conclusion 
that lower secondary education is an inconvenient investment for disadvantaged 
students, as they would very likely obtain a negative return; hence, they behave 
rationally, dropping out of school early.
CONCLUSIONS
In most countries, schooling decisions seem to have a clear association with 
level of income. This is even more troublesome in developing countries, where 
high exit rates at compulsory stages are common. Why could this be happening? 
When students heterogeneity is considered, it can be seen that the benefits and 
costs of education differ across income groups. Indeed, differences in the quality 
of education and in the probability of repetition make the difference between an 
attractive and an inconvenient investment in secondary education between advan-
taged and disadvantaged students. Thus, according to this approach, both groups 
taking opposite schooling decisions behave equally rationally. Not including dif-
ferences in life expectancy across income groups is a limitation of the analysis, 
although its consideration would reinforce the results.
The values of the expected IRR computed for the Uruguayan case show 
that, paradoxically, lower secondary education is an inconvenient investment for 
disadvantaged students—even disregarding the possibility of their not being able 
to afford the opportunity costs—which probably explains the heavy dropout rates 
of this student type in developing countries. Previous studies on returns to school-
ing, even when methodologies are not comparable, also provide low estimates for 
rates of return for secondary studies, for instance Duryea et al. (2003) and Duryea 
and Pages (2002). These results cast some serious doubts on the fairness of com-
pulsory schooling laws that are not accompanied by complementary policies that 
ensure equal learning outcomes across socioeconomic groups.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix shows computations based on Table 4 in the text. Table 4 
shows average values for which available data allow quite straightforward esti-
mate of non-observable variables. Based on averaged values, plausible scenarios 
of dispersion around the average will be considered as follows: low dispersion (
equally rationally. Not including differences in life expectancy across 
income groups is a limitation of the analysis, although its consideration 
would reinforce the results. 
The values of the expected IRR computed for the Uruguayan 
case show that, paradoxically, lower secondary education is an 
inconvenient investment for disadvantaged students—even disregarding 
the possibility of their not being able to afford the opportunity costs—
which probably explains the heavy dropout rates of this student type in 
developing countries. Previous studies on returns to schooling, even 
when methodologies are not comparable, also provide low estimates for 
rates of return for secondary studies, for instance Duryea et al. (2003) 
and Duryea and Pages (2002). These results cast some serious doubts 
on the fairness of compulsory schooling laws that are not accompanied 
by complementary policies that ensure equal learning outcomes across 
socioeconomic groups. 
 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix shows computations based on Table 4 in the text. 
Table 4 shows average values for which available data allow quite 
straightforward estimate of non-observable variables. Based on 
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), high dispersion (
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on the fairness of compulsory schooling laws that are not accompanied 
by complementary policies that ensure equal learning outcomes across 
s ci economic groups. 
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Table 4 shows average values for w ich available data allow quite 
straightforw rd estimate of n n-observable variables. Based on 
averaged values, plausible scenari s of dispersion around the average 
will be considered as follows: low dispersi n ( %10 ), medium 
dispersion ( %40 ), igh dispersion ( %80 ). Values obtained for LSif  
by student typ  are used for computati n of the xpected IRR in Table 6 
in the text. 
Table A.1 - Computati n of n n-obs rved variables:  
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Estudios Económicos. N° 61, Julio-Diciembre 2013. 27-4238
ESTUDIOS ECONOMICOS
Table A.1 - Computation of non-observed variables: 
Average and low dispersion
AVERAGE LOW DISPERSION (
equally rationally. Not including differences in life expectancy across 
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would reinforce the results. 
The values of the expected IRR computed for the Uruguayan 
case show that, paradoxically, lower secondary education is an 
inconvenient investment for disadvantaged students—even disregarding 
the possibility of their not being able to afford the opportunity costs—
which probably explains the heavy dropout rates of this student type in 
developing countries. Previous studies on returns to schooling, even 
when methodologies are not comparable, also provide low estimates for 
rates of return for secondary studies, for instance Duryea et al. (2003) 
and Duryea and Pages (2002). These results cast some serious doubts 
on the fairness of compulsory schooling laws that are not accompanied 
by complementary policies that ensure equal learning outcomes across 
socioeconomic groups. 
 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix shows computations based on Table 4 in the text. 
Table 4 shows average values for which available data allow quite 
straightforward estimate of non-observable variables. Based on 
averaged values, plausible scenarios of dispersion around the average 
will be considered as follows: low dispersion ( %10 ), medium 
dispersion ( %40 ), high dispersion ( %80 ). Values obtained for LSif  
by student type are used for computation of the expected IRR in Table 6 
in the text. 
Table A.1 - Computation of non-observed variables:  
Average and low dispersion 
 AVERAGE LOW DISPERSION ( %10 ) 
 jr  jq  jf  
Disadvantaged 
Dq  
Disadvantaged 
Df
Advantaged
Aq
Advantaged
Af
0   1.00     
)
jr jq jf
Disadvantaged
Dq
Disadvantaged
Df
Advantaged
Aq
Advantaged
Af
0 1.00
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
Disadvantaged  
 1.27
0.05 1.32
0.05 1.37
0.05 1.42
 0.15  
Advantaged  
 Pf 1.33
0.06 1.39
0.06 1.45
0.06 1.51
 0.18  
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
 3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
 LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
 3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf .51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 .30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.3
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf .2   
   1S .  1Sf .3   
   2LS  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf .33  
   1S .  1Sf .39  
   2LS  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 .41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 .30 .3  1.30 .27 .27 .33 1.33
2 .13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf .27  
   1S .  1Sf . 2  
   2  .  2f .37  
   3LS  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf . 3  
   1S .  1Sf .39  
   2  .  2f .45  
   3LS  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf   
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.5   
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  . 5 1LSf .   
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.5   
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0. 5 2LSf .   
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.5   
    LSq  0.18     
Pf
Estudios Económicos. N° 61, Julio-Diciembre 2013. 27-42 39
WHEN MORE SCHOOLING IS NOT WORTH THE EFFORT: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DROPOUT...
Table A.2 -  Computation of non-observed variables: 
Average and medium dispersion
AVERAGE MEDIUM DISPERSION (
 
Table A.2 -  Computation of non-observed variables: Average and 
medium dispersion 
 AVERAGE MEDIUM DISPERSION ( %40 )  
 jr  jq  jf  
Disadvantag
ed 
Dq  
Disadvantag
ed 
Df
Advantag
ed 
Aq
Advantag
ed 
Af
0   
1.0
0     
1 
0.3
0 
0.3
0 
1.3
0 0.18 1.18 0.42 1.42 
2 
0.1
3 
0.1
7 
1.4
7 0.10 1.28 0.23 1.65 
3 
0.4
1 
0.6
0 
2.0
6 0.36 1.64 0.83 2.49 
4 
0.9
1 
1.8
8 
3.9
4 1.13 2.76 2.63 5.12 
   
 
 
Lower secondary    
    
Disadvantag
ed     
      Pf 1.18  
) 
jr jq jf
Disadvantaged
Dq
Disadvantaged
Df
Advantaged
Aq
Advantaged
Af
0 1.00
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.18 1.18 0.42 1.42
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.10 1.28 0.23 1.65
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.36 1.64 0.83 2.49
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.13 2.76 2.63 5.12
Lower secondary
Disadvantaged  
 1.18
0.03 1.21
0.03 1.25
0.03 1.28
 0.10  
Advantaged  
 1.42
0.08 1.50
0.08 1.58
0.08 1.65
 0.23  
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf .32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4. 3
     Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  .05 3LSf 1.42  
LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
LSq  0.18    
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LS .32  
   2  .  2 . 7  
3  3 42
    LSq
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LS . 9  
2 2 45
   3  .  3 .51  
    LSq 0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LS .32  
   2  .  2 . 7  
3  3 42
LSq
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  .06 1LS . 9  
2 2 45
   3  .  3 .51  
    LSq 0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 .41 .6  2.06 .54 .96 .66 2.17
4 .91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1 27  
   1LSq  05 1LS 32  
   2  .  2f . 7  
   3  .  3f .42  
    LS  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LS . 9  
   2 .  2f .45  
   3  .  3f .51  
    LS  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 .41 .6  2.06 .54 .96 .66 2.17
4 .91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LS .32  
   2  .  2f . 7  
   3  .  3f .42  
    LS  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LS . 9  
   2 .  2f .45  
   3  .  3f .51  
    LS  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf .45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
 LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf .45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf 1.51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1.27 0.33 1.33
2 0.13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
    LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf .51  
    LSq  0.18     
1 0.30 0.30 1.30 0.27 1. 7 0.33 1.33
2 .13 0.17 1.47 0.15 1.42 0.18 1.51
3 0.41 0.60 2.06 0.54 1.96 0.66 2.17
4 0.91 1.88 3.94 1.69 3.65 2.07 4.23
      Pf 1.27  
   1LSq  0.05 1LSf 1.32  
   2LSq  0.05 2LSf 1.37  
   3LSq  0.05 3LSf 1.42  
 LSq  
      Pf 1.33  
   1LSq  0.06 1LSf 1.39  
   2LSq  0.06 2LSf 1.45  
   3LSq  0.06 3LSf .51  
    LSq  0.18     
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Table A.3 - Computation of non-observed variables: Average and high dispersion
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